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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article will discuss the theory of judicial takings and its applicability to 
decisions of state courts—specifically state court decisions involving public water-
ways and private property. Judicial takings have been only modestly recognized, 
but several members of the U.S. Supreme Court clearly admit the potential for a 
judicial taking exists.
1
 PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana
2
 presented a prime oppor-
tunity for the Court to clarify several issues surrounding the judicial takings theory. 
However, when the Court delivered its opinion in PPL Montana, it failed to address 
the judicial takings issue even though the facts of PPL Montana were similar to a 
case where a plurality declared the Takings Clause applied to the judiciary. This 
article will explain why the Court failed to address the judicial takings theory in 
PPL Montana, as well as discuss the factual circumstances and requirements that 
warrant designation as a judicial taking that requires just compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment. 
This article will first provide a general overview of the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The article will then develop a 
working background of the judicial takings theory and the jurisprudence surround-
ing that theory of law. After introducing the Takings Clause and the judicial takings 
theory, the article will discuss the first Supreme Court plurality to adopt the judicial 
takings theory and arguments and discussions stemming from that decision. The 
article will then discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in PPL Montana, LLC v. 
Montana, including the history, facts, arguments and discussions stemming from 
the case, and the implications of the Court’s decision. Next, the article will demon-
strate that no alternative theories of law protect property rights sufficiently enough 
to preclude an application of the judicial takings theory. The article will then pro-
vide a working background of the public trust doctrine, as well as its effect in PPL 
Montana, and the judicial takings theory as a whole. In closing, the article will pro-
vide an application of the judicial takings theory to PPL Montana, before discuss-
ing the circumstances and facts that would affect a judicial taking. 
 
II. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 
The Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that private property 
cannot be taken for public use without just compensation.
3
 The Court has recog-
nized two categories of government regulation of private property that are compen-
sable as per se takings under the Fifth Amendment without a case-specific inquiry 
into the public interest advanced by the government action.
4
 The first, physical tak-
ings, are “regulations that compel the property owner to suffer a physical ‘invasion’ 
of his property.”5 Accordingly, no matter how small the governmental intrusion and 
                                                          
 1. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 
(2010) (plurality opinion), was the first plurality opinion acknowledging that the Takings Clause applies to 
the judiciary. 
 2. PPL Mont., LLC, v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 4. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–17 (1992). 
 5. Id. at 1015. 
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no matter how great the public purpose behind the intrusion, physical invasion of 
private property by the government is always a taking requiring just compensation.
6
 
Regulatory takings also occur “where regulation denies all economically beneficial 
or productive use of land.”7 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court 
held a regulatory taking had occurred when a government agency declared that the 
plaintiff could not develop residential lots he had purchased for that exact pur-
pose—thus, all economically beneficial or productive use of the plaintiff’s land had 
been denied.
8
 While the Court has never specified the rationale of this category of 
takings, the Court has hinted that deprivation of beneficial use is the same as a 
physical taking from a property owner’s perspective.9 
Regulatory actions other than the two per se takings actions illustrated in Lu-
cas are governed by Penn Central Transportation Company. v. City of New York.
10
 
The Penn Central framework centers largely around two factors to determine 
whether a taking requiring compensation has occurred: 1) the economic impact of 
the regulations on the claimant and the extent of interference with the claimant’s 
investment-backed expectations by the regulations, and 2) the character of the gov-
ernment action.
11
 Essentially, the Takings Clause does not prohibit the government 
from taking private property, but merely places a condition, namely just compensa-
tion, on the government’s exercise of its authority to interfere with the enjoyment 
of a landowner’s rights.12 
A. The Rise of the Judicial Takings Theory 
While it is clear that the Takings Clause applies to government intrusion upon 
property rights, nothing in the Takings Clause itself, or in the case law discussing 
the clause, suggests that only the executive and legislative branches of government 
can effect takings requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
13
 Per-
haps the central argument concerning the practical implications of excluding judi-
cial action from the Takings Clause is that if state courts can avoid paying just 
compensation by designating the judiciary with condemnation authority, the Tak-
ings Clause is effectively null and void.
14
 Accordingly, shortly after the turn of the 
twentieth century, and then again during the 1960s, the idea of the judiciary effect-
ing a taking under the Fifth Amendment began echoing through judicial opinions.
15
 
                                                          
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. 
 8. See generally Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003. 
 9. Id. at 1016–17. 
 10. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 11. Id. at 124. 
 12. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005). 
 13. Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the Problem of Judicial Takings, 6 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 97 (2011). 
 14. Stacey L. Dogan & Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and Collateral Attack on State Court 
Property Decisions, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 110 (2011). 
 15. See generally Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 114 S. Ct. 1332, 1334–35 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 295–97 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring); Muhlker v. N.Y 
& Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544, 568 (1905); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1473–75 (9th Cir. 
1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986); Sotomura v. Cnty. of Haw., 460 F. Supp. 473, 477–83 (D. Haw. 
1978). 
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As stated by Justice Stewart in Hughes v. Washington, judicial takings occur when 
a state court decision effects a “sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms 
of the relevant precedents . . . .”16 When determining whether such a change has 
occurred, Justice Stewart believed the relevant inquiry focuses on a state court’s 
actions, not what it says or intends to do.
17
 Following the judicial inquisition into 
the theory of a judicially-enacted taking, the concept of judicial takings began to 
appear in law reviews early in the 1990s.
18
 
The Supreme Court’s first, major acknowledgement of the possibility of a ju-
dicial taking, however, came in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida De-
partment of Environmental Protection.
19
 In fact, a major factor for the Court’s grant 
of certiorari in Stop the Beach was to expound upon the issue of judicial takings.
20
 
 
 
III. THE STOP THE BEACH DECISION 
In Stop the Beach, the Court defined the central inquiry regarding the judicial 
takings theory as “whether an action by the judicial branch of government can ever 
be a ‘taking’ requiring the payment of compensation.”21 Because the Court’s deci-
sion in Stop the Beach was the first time the Court had directly addressed the prob-
lem of judicial takings, a working knowledge of that case is necessary to fully un-
derstand judicial takings and to apply the concept to PPL Montana. 
The dispute in Stop the Beach primarily concerned Florida’s Beach and Shore 
Preservation Act, under which Florida is required to conduct projects to restore and 
nourish beaches that become critically eroded.
22
 When a restoration or nourishment 
project is finished, title to any formerly submerged land that becomes dry land be-
cause of the project’s displacement of the previous water line vests in the state.23 
This practice sometimes deprives beachfront property owners of their previous 
ownership of land extending up to the mean high water mark.
24
 In short, the pro-
jects sometimes create areas of dry land—which are owned by the state—in be-
tween private waterfront property and the water.
25
 The particular project in this 
                                                          
 16. Hughes, 389 U.S. at 296 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 17. Id. at 298. 
 18. D. Benjamin Barros, Introduction to the Symposium on Judicial Takings, 21 WIDENER L. J. 
621, 625 (2012) (citing: David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judi-
cial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1996); W. David Sarratt, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 
90 VA. L. REV. 1487 (2004); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449 (1990); and 
Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings, and Judicial Tak-
ings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379 (2001)). 
 19. Somin, supra note 13, at 91. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2599 
(2010). 
 23. Id.  
 24. While state property law defines “mean high-water line,” in Florida, it refers to the ordinary 
boundary between private beachfront property and state-owned beach. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2598. 
In Florida, state-owned beach consists of all beachfront below the average high tide line over the preceding 
nineteen years. Id.  
 25. Id. at 2598. 
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case created exactly this scenario for six individual property owners.
26
 These prop-
erty owners joined together to form Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., in order to 
bring an administrative challenge to the State’s restoration project of the beach in 
front of their homes.
27
 
In response to the administrative challenge, the District Court of Appeal for 
the First District of Florida found that the Act eliminated two of Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc.’s littoral rights: 1) the right to receive accretions to their prop-
erty; and 2) the right to have their property’s contact with the ocean remain intact.28 
The District Court further believed that the Act unconstitutionally deprived “upland 
owners of littoral rights without just compensation,” and certified that question to 
the Florida Supreme Court.
29
 
In its opinion, the Florida Supreme Court answered the question in the nega-
tive, concluding the doctrine of avulsion
30
 allowed Florida to “reclaim the restored 
beach on behalf of the public.”31 The Florida Supreme Court went on to state that 
the right of accretions
32
 is a future contingent interest as opposed to a vested prop-
erty right, and that no littoral right to contact with the water stems from the littoral 
right of access to the water, which is unaffected by the Act.
33
 Significantly, Stop 
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. sought rehearing, claiming that the Florida Supreme 
Court’s decision itself affected an unconstitutional taking of property.34 The Florida 
Supreme Court denied the rehearing request, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.
35
 
Though unable to garner majority support for his opinion, Justice Scalia’s 
plurality opinion, joined by Justices Alito, Thomas, and Roberts began with a dis-
cussion of “the classic taking” driven by eminent domain, but stated that the Tak-
ings Clause applies to other state actions that amount to the government’s exercise 
of its eminent domain power.
36
 Justice Scalia went on to state that under the Fifth 
Amendment, states effect a taking if they re-characterize as public property what 
was previously private property.
37
 After further discussing the Takings Clause in 
general, Scalia’s opinion goes on to acknowledge judicial takings: 
The Takings Clause . . . is not addressed to the action of a specific branch 
or branches. It is concerned simply with the act, and not with the govern-
mental actor . . . . There is no textual justification for saying that the exist-
ence or the scope of a State’s power to expropriate private property with-
                                                          
 26. Somin, supra note 13, at 93. 
 27. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2600.  
 28. Id.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Avulsion refers to “[a] sudden removal of land caused by change in a river’s course or by 
flood. Land removed by avulsion remains the property of the original owner.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
157 (9th ed. 2009). 
 31. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2600.  
 32. Accretion refers to “[t]he gradual accumulation of land by natural forces . . . .” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 23 (9th ed. 2009). 
 33. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2600.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 2600–01. 
 36. Id. at 2601.  
 37. Id.  
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out just compensation varies according to the branch of government ef-
fecting the expropriation . . . [i]t would be absurd to allow a State to do by 
judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fi-
at.
38
 
Additionally, Justice Scalia stated that the Court’s own precedents do not 
support the idea that takings conducted by the judicial branch should be afforded 
any special treatment, leaving no doubt as to the meaning of his opinion by stating 
that if a court declares that a once established property right no longer exists, it has 
taken the property.
39
 However, because “[t]he Takings Clause only protects proper-
ty rights as they are established under state law, not as they might have been estab-
lished or ought to have been established,” Justice Scalia declined to hold that the 
Florida Supreme Court had effected a taking under the Fifth Amendment.
40
 
A. Concurrences in Stop the Beach 
Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor, concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment, were not so willing to extend the Takings Clause to judicial action. Re-
garding the question of whether the Takings Clause is implicated when a court de-
clares that a previously established property right no longer exists, Justice Kennedy 
answered in the negative.
41
 Justice Kennedy focused on the Due Process Clause as 
a limitation to judicial decisions affecting established property rights.
42
 Specifical-
ly, Justice Kennedy stated that if a court eliminated an established property right, 
its judgment could be set aside as a deprivation of property without due process of 
law—a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.43 Kennedy further contended that 
both the procedural and substantive aspects of the Due Process Clause preclude 
extension of the Takings Clause to the judiciary.
44
 
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment, were also unwilling to join in Justice Scalia’s analysis of the Takings Clause 
implications raised in Stop the Beach.
45
 Justice Breyer agreed that no unconstitu-
tional taking of property occurred here, but declined to join in other aspects of the 
decision because he felt they concerned areas of constitutional law that did not war-
rant discussion in the case.
46
 Notably, however, Justice Breyer expressed concern 
with the application of the Federal Takings Clause to judicial actions for the prima-
ry reason that property law is generally governed by states individually.
47
 Also ap-
parent in Justice Breyer’s concurrence was a concern for creating a flood of litiga-
tion: “Losing parties in many state-court cases may well believe that erroneous 
                                                          
 38. Id.  
 39. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 40. Id. at 2612.  
 41. Id. at 2614.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2618. 
 46. Id.   
 47. Id. at 2618–19. 
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judicial decisions have deprived them of property rights they previously held and 
may consequently bring federal takings claims.”48 
Justice Stevens would have been the deciding vote in the case, but recused 
himself from taking part in the decision because he owns beachfront property in 
Florida.
49
 
B. Where Does Stop the Beach Leave the Judicial Takings Discussion? 
While the U.S. Supreme Court at least took the initiative to address the prob-
lem of judicial takings in Stop the Beach, none of the justices that participated in 
the opinion believed an unconstitutional taking had occurred.
50
 More troubling is 
the fact that only four justices acknowledged that a judicial taking could occur.
51
 
However, some find great promise in the plurality opinion. Bradley Gould, a prop-
erty attorney at Holland & Knight, LLP whose practice focuses on eminent domain 
and land use litigation, touted the decision as “very significant.”52 Gould went on to 
say that although the decision is a plurality opinion, it would likely still be a per-
suasive argument for private property advocates and property owners to prevent the 
redefinition of private property into public property by state courts.
53
 Gould also 
expressed some reservation with the Court’s explanation of accretion and avulsion, 
and stated, “if the government decides to improve property or property rights that 
they don't own, then [sic] that should give rise to a taking and a requirement of 
compensation.”54 
Additionally, John Echeverria,
55
 noted that Stop the Beach “underscores the 
importance of the judicial selection process and how divided the [C]ourt is on the 
property rights question.”56 Echeverria also expressed that the ideological split in 
the Court regarding property issues will put the judicial takings issue on the Su-
preme Court backburner for the near future.
57
 It is worth noting that Echeverria 
authored an amicus brief in support of the State of Florida on behalf of the Ameri-
can Planning Association when the Court granted certiorari in Stop the Beach.
58
 
C. Amicus Briefs in Stop the Beach 
The plurality’s belief that the judiciary can effect a taking requiring just com-
pensation drew extensive attention to Stop the Beach in the form of amicus briefs. 
                                                          
 48. Id. at 2619. 
 49. Nick Malinowski, ‘Judicial Takings’ Still Unresolved by High Court Ruling, FORDHAM 
LAW NEWSROOM (June 17, 2010), http://law.fordham.edu/newsroom/18577.htm.  
 50. See supra Part III. 
 51. See supra Part III. 
 52. Malinowski, supra note 49. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Echeverria is a Professor at the Vermont School of Law and has written extensively on tak-
ings and other natural resource issues. Faculty Directory, VERMONT SCH. OF L., 
http://www.vermontlaw.edu/our_faculty/faculty_directory/john_d_echeverria.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 
2013). 
 56. Malinowski, supra note 49. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See infra Part III.C.1. 
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Because the amicus briefs filed in Stop the Beach discuss an issue of near first-
impression for the Court, the arguments presented by entities on either side of the 
issue are worth discussing. 
1. Briefs Supporting Respondent (State) 
Leading the discussion against the plurality’s decision was John Echeverria’s 
argument. In an amicus brief supporting Florida, Echeverria reminded the Court 
that it had never before held a judicial action to be a taking, and urged the Court to 
refrain from acknowledging judicial takings now.
59
 Echeverria went on to argue 
that the Supremacy Clause in the federal constitution offered the Court a means of 
setting aside a state court ruling that vindicated a federal right,
60
 and that private 
property owners could attack a state court ruling as lacking a fair and substantial 
basis if the owner contended that a ruling on state property law has precluded a 
federal taking claim.
61
 
Echeverria further urged that the judicial takings argument should be discred-
ited because the Court had rejected the theory more than one hundred years ago
62
 
and had followed that ruling up to Stop the Beach.
63
 
Also claimed was that the judicial takings theory violated both the limitations 
on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to federal inquiries and the correct reading of 
the Takings Clause.
64
 Echeverria argued that judicial takings should be rejected 
because the word “property,” as used in the Takings Clause, is defined by state law, 
not the federal constitution.
65
 “When . . . the nature and scope of the property at 
issue has been defined by a state court under state common law, the state court rul-
ing on the issue represents the final word . . .” and the Supreme Court lacks the 
authority to directly review the state court's decision under any theory.
66
 Citing 
Riley v. Kennedy,
67
 Echeverria correctly stated that a state’s highest court is the 
ultimate authority on that state’s laws—including property laws.68 In addition, Ech-
everria cited Herb v. Pitcairn
69
 for the principle that the Supreme Court will not 
review state court decisions that are based on adequate and independent state 
                                                          
 59. Brief for the Am. Planning Ass’n & the Florida Chapter of the Am. Planning Ass’n as Ami-
cus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130 
S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 3199617, at 2 [hereinafter Brief for the Am. Planning Ass’n]. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  
 62. See Sauer v. New York, 206 U.S. 536, 548 (1907). “[T]his court has neither the right nor the 
duty . . . to reduce the law of the various states to a uniform rule which it shall announce and impose. Upon 
the ground, then, that under the law of New York, as determined by its highest court, the plaintiff never 
owned the easements which he claimed, and that therefore there was no property taken, we hold that no 
violation of the 14th amendment is shown.” Id. at 548. Echeverria finds Sauer v. City of New York highly 
relevant to the judicial takings debate. Brief for the Am. Planning Ass’n, supra note 59, at 7. However, it is 
worth noting that the Court found that no property existed, before it found that no taking had occurred. 
Sauer, 206 U.S. at 548. 
 63. Brief for the Am. Planning Ass’n, supra note 59, at 4. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 425–426 (2008). 
 68.  Brief for the Am. Planning Ass’n, supra note 59, at 4–5. 
 69. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125–26 (1945). 
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grounds. 70  Accordingly, the following statement sums Echeverria’s arguments 
against federal courts interpreting state law property law: 
Because the Takings Clause points to state law to define property, and be-
cause state courts are the final expositors of the meaning of state law, there 
is no basis for seeking review under the Takings Clause of a state court 
ruling on the nature and scope of a state property interest.
71
 
Echeverria went on to argue that the language of the Takings Clause discred-
its the judicial takings theory: “the Takings Clause makes a distinction between 
‘property’ and ‘taking,’ thereby establishing a two-step inquiry, focusing first on 
the property issue and then on the taking issue.”72 In line with this two-step takings 
inquiry, Echeverria found trouble with any reading of the Takings Clause that holds 
a state court’s determination of whether or not a property interest exists to be a tak-
ing.
73
 Also stemming from his two-step inquiry theory is Echeverria’s argument 
that is centered on the idea that no evidence exists supporting the idea that the 
drafters of the constitution ever contemplated that a judicial common law ruling 
could constitute a taking.
74
 Instead, Echeverria believed the drafters’ primary goal 
in effecting the Takings Clause was to codify the practice of eminent domain in 
terms of roads over private lands, as well as address public concern for military 
sequestering of livestock.
75
 
In his final attempt to derail Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.’s takings ar-
gument, Echeverria asserted the petitioners only argued that the Florida Supreme 
Court instituted a “bad faith” application of state law in attempt to defeat Federal 
Constitutional rights.
76
 Echeverria correctly asserted that the validity of a takings 
claim rests on whether or not the government has acted for a “public use.”77 How-
ever, this assertion by Echeverria seems to ignore the fact that the Florida Supreme 
Court redefined petitioner’s lands as public beachfront. 
2. Briefs in Support of Petitioner 
The petitioner’s position on the takings issue in Stop the Beach was not nearly 
as well supported by amicus filings as was respondent’s position. Several briefs in 
support of petitioner were filed, however, raising astute arguments regarding the 
effect of the Takings Clause on the judiciary’s power. Perhaps the most striking of 
arguments in support of judicial takings was made in the Brief of Amici Curiae of 
the National Association of Home Builders and Florida Home Builders Association 
Supporting Petitioners (Home Builders Brief).
78
 
                                                          
 70. Brief for the Am. Planning Ass’n, supra note 59, at 5–6. 
 71. Id. at 6. 
 72. Id. at 12. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 13. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 14. 
 77. Brief for the Am. Planning Ass’n, supra note 59, at 14. 
 78. Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders & Florida Home Builders Ass’n as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.Ct. 2592 
(2010) (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 2574816 [hereinafter Home Builders Brief]. 
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The arguments set forth by the Home Builders Brief rested on the premise 
that the Taking Clause must be applied to the judiciary as a result of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
79
 The Court has long held that the Fourteenth Amendment encom-
passes all state action, including state judicial action.
80
 While the issue in Shelly v. 
Kramer
81
 involved racially motivated restrictive covenants as a violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court did not limit the applica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment to Due Process and Equal Protection issues, 
instead providing for a broad application of the amendment to state judicial ac-
tion.
82
 The Home Builders Brief supported this assertion with other instances where 
state court action has been found to violate various aspects of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, including: the Supreme Court of Alabama’s libel judgment against the 
New York Times;
83
 a state court’s eviction of a tenant as retaliation for reporting 
housing code violations;
84
 and a New York appeals court’s infringement on a prop-
erty owner’s easement.85 These instances all implicated an application of the Four-
teenth Amendment, illustrating that the “state action” requirement of the Amend-
ment applied to the judiciary in addition to the executive branch and legislature.
86
 
Finally, The Home Builders Brief identified that the Takings Clause is appli-
cable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
87
 Accordingly, the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause applies to the individual states through the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, requiring that a state government pay 
just compensation if it takes private property for public use.
88
 
Justice Harlan also supported including the judiciary when applying the Tak-
ings Clause in Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago: 
If compensation for private property taken for public use is an essential el-
ement of due process of law as ordained by the fourteenth amendment, 
then the final judgment of a state court, under the authority of which the 
property is in fact taken, is to be deemed the act of the state, within the 
meaning of that amendment.
89
 
Because of this incorporation of the Takings Clause into the Fourteenth 
Amendment, state courts can be held liable for affecting a taking.90 Accordingly, 
the argument put forth in the Home Builders Brief can be logically summarized as 
                                                          
 79. Id. at 3. 
 80. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18 (1948). “[F]rom the time of the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment until the present, it has been the consistent ruling of this Court that the action of the 
States to which the Amendment has reference, includes action of state courts and state judicial officials. 
Although, in construing the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, differences have from time to time been 
expressed as to whether particular types of state action may be said to offend the Amendment’s prohibitory 
provisions, it has never been suggested that state court action is immunized from the operation of those 
provisions simply because the act is that of the judicial branch of the state government.” Id.  
 81. Id.   
 82. Home Builders Brief, supra note 78, at 4. 
 83. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
 84. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 85. See generally Muhlker v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544 (1905).  
 86. Home Builders Brief, supra note 78, at 7. 
 87. Id. at 8. 
 88. Id. (citing Chi., B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 336 (1897)).  
 89. Chi., B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chi, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897). 
90
 Id. at 241. 
2013] POWER TO THE PEOPLE: HYDROELECTRIC UTILITIES AND THE 
NEED FOR RECOGNITION OF THE JUDICIAL TAKINGS THEORY 
179 
 
follows: “judicial action is encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s applica-
bility to state action;”91 the Court has established that the Takings Clause applies to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
92
  Thus, “because the Takings 
Clause applies to state action through the Fourteenth Amendment—and judicial 
action is encompassed by state action—then the Takings Clause must apply to judi-
cial action and decisions.”93 
With an issue very similar to that in Stop the Beach arising in PPL Montana, 
and all nine justices participating in the decision,
94
 the Court appears to have fum-
bled the chance to solidify judicial takings as a form of unconstitutional activity 
under the Takings Clause. This is especially true considering the fact that the Court 
made no mention of the Takings Clause in PPL Montana, despite the fact that sev-
eral amicus briefs had addressed the topic in some detail. 
 
 
 
IV. PPL MONTANA, LLC V. MONTANA 
A. History and Background of PPL Montana 
PPL Montana, LLC is a utility company that owns and operates hydroelectric 
facilities and dams throughout the State of Montana.
95
 Several of its hydroelectric 
facilities are located on riverbeds, the subject of the underlying dispute between 
PPL and the state of Montana, under segments of the Upper Missouri, Madison, 
and Clark Fork Rivers.
96
 PPL Montana acquired these facilities in 1999 from the 
Montana Power Company, although the facilities themselves have existed for dec-
ades, some for more than a century.
97
 Although Montana became aware of the ex-
istence of these hydroelectric facilities at the time they were constructed, and vari-
ous state agencies of Montana participated in federal licensing proceedings for the 
facilities, the State had never sought compensation for use of the riverbeds underly-
ing the facilities from either the Montana Power Company or PPL Montana until 
2003.
98
 Rather, the understanding of both PPL Montana and the United States was 
that the utility company had always paid rents to the United States for use of ripari-
an areas flooded by the company’s hydroelectric projects.99 
The cause of the dispute between PPL Montana and the State of Montana 
came in 2003, when parents of Montana school children initiated a federal lawsuit, 
alleging that the riverbeds underlying PPL Montana’s hydroelectric facilities were 
                                                          
91
 Home Builders Brief, supra note 78, at 3. 
 92. Id. at 8–9. 
 93. Id. at 3. 
 94. See generally PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012). 
 95. Id. at 1225.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  
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owned by the State, and part of Montana’s school trust lands.100 Montana joined the 
lawsuit seeking rents for PPL Montana’s use of the riverbeds for the first time, alt-
hough that lawsuit was dismissed for lack of diversity jurisdiction.
101
 
In response to the parents’ federal lawsuit, PPL Montana and two other power 
companies fired back, suing Montana in state court, arguing that Montana could not 
seek compensation for the company’s use of the riverbeds.102 The State counter-
claimed, stating that it owned the riverbeds under the equal-footing doctrine,
103
 and 
could seek compensation for PPL Montana’s use of the riverbeds.104 The trial court 
granted summary judgment to the State and ordered PPL Montana to pay the State 
almost $41 million in rents said to have accrued between 2000 and 2007.
105
 
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed.
106
 In determining who 
owned the land underlying the riverbeds, the court examined the navigability of the 
rivers at the time of Montana’s statehood.107 In its opinion, the Montana Supreme 
Court admitted that particular segments of the rivers in question were not navigable 
when Montana entered the Union.
108
 
However, the Montana Supreme Court construed navigability for title purpos-
es by assessing the navigability of the rivers as wholes, even though Lewis and 
Clark were forced to portage around the obstructions in the rivers utilized by PPL 
Montana.
109
 The Montana court reasoned that short interruptions in navigability are 
insufficient as a matter of law to declare the rivers non-navigable because travelers 
had easily circumvented those stretches by overland portage.
110
 The court also re-
lied heavily on the present-day use of recreational crafts on the Madison River to 
find those river segments navigable.
111
 
The effect of the Montana court’s ruling was to force PPL Montana to pay 
rent for the use of riverbeds to the State of Montana.112 By holding that the rivers in 
question were in fact navigable at the time of Montana’s statehood, the Montana 
                                                          
 100. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1225. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. 
 103. The equal-equal footing doctrine can be summed as follows: “Upon statehood, the State 
gains title within its borders to the beds of waters then navigable…. It may allocate and govern those lands 
according to state law subject only to ‘the paramount power of the United States to control such waters for 
purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign commerce.’ The United States retains any title vested in it 
before statehood to any land beneath waters not then navigable (and not tidally influenced), to be trans-
ferred or licensed if and as it chooses.” Id. at 1227–28 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Oregon, 
295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935)). 
 104. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1225. 
 105. Id. at 1225–26. 
 106. PPL Mont., LLC v. State, 229 P.3d 421, 460–61 (Mont. 2010), rev’d and remanded, 132 S. 
Ct. 1215 (2012). 
 107. Id. at 444–50. 
 108. Id. at 469. A segment of the Missouri River, for example, consists of a series of cascades and 
rapids that drop over 400 feet in less than ten miles. The last of the “Great Falls,” and the one that Lewis 
and Clark would have encountered first, is the tallest of the falls in that stretch at nearly ninety feet. The 
Madison River shares the turbulent nature of the Missouri River, and is one of its tributaries. Additionally, 
the Clark Fork River is “marked by ‘many waterfalls and boxed gorges.’” PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1222–
24 (citing FED. WRITERS' PROJECTS OF THE WORKS PROGRESS ADMIN., IDAHO: A GUIDE IN WORD AND 
PICTURE 230 (2d ed. 1950)). 
 109. PPL Mont., LLC v. State, 229 P.3d at 448–50.  
 110. Id. at 449. 
 111. Id. at 435. 
112
 PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1226. 
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Supreme Court ruled that the State of Montana may collect rent from utility com-
panies, such as PPL Montana, for the use of riverbeds.113 PPL Montana appealed 
the decision of the Montana Supreme Court; the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed.
114
 
B. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Response to the Montana Court 
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that the Montana Supreme 
Court’s decision, giving Montana title to riverbeds throughout the State and the 
authority to charge for the use of those riverbeds, “was based upon an infirm legal 
understanding of this Court’s rules of navigability for title under the equal-footing 
doctrine.”115 As a result, the Montana Supreme Court’s decision was reversed and 
remanded, freeing the utility company from liability for nearly $41 million in back-
payments of rent to the State.116 
The Supreme Court found the Montana court had erred in its approach con-
cerning the question of river segments and portage.117 Three main factors caused 
the Court to disagree with the Montana court’s analysis: segment-by-segment anal-
ysis for navigability purposes; the Montana state court’s prior usage of the seg-
ment-by-segment analysis; and the Montana Supreme Court’s “short interruption” 
theory.
118
 
1. The Segment Analysis for Navigability 
In order to determine riverbed title under the equal-footing doctrine, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court employs a segment-by-segment analysis to assess the nav-
igability of rivers and streams.
119
 The Montana Supreme Court, however, examined 
the navigability of the rivers as a whole for its determination of riverbed title.
120
 
The United States Supreme Court noted that a main justification for sovereign 
ownership of navigable riverbeds is that a contrary rule would afford private riv-
erbed owners the right to construct improvements on their section of riverbed that 
may interfere with the public’s right to use the waterway for commerce.121 Howev-
er, because no commerce could have taken place on segments that were not naviga-
ble at the time of statehood, there is no reason that the State should own those seg-
ments under the equal footing doctrine.
122
 
                                                          
113
 PPL Mont., LLC v. State, 229 P.3d at 460–61. 
 114. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1226. 
 115. Id. at 1235. 
116
 Id. at 1226, 1235. 
117
 Id. at 1229–31. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 1229. Under the equal-footing doctrine, a state gains title to navigable waters within its 
borders when it enters the Union. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1227–28. If the rivers in question were naviga-
ble when Montana entered the Union, Montana gained title to those riverbeds. 
 120. Id. at 1229. 
 121. Id. at 1230. 
 122. Id. at 1230–31. 
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2. Montana’s Prior Use of the Segment Analysis 
The United States Supreme Court further noted that the physical impairments 
affecting navigability vary over the length of a stream, particularly in the moun-
tainous areas of the West.
123
 Additionally, the Court found that the segment ap-
proach is used to determine starting points and ending points of disputed river seg-
ments, and that Montana state courts have used the segment approach when divid-
ing riverbeds in order to determine their value and chargeable rents, specifically the 
rents the State sought to charge PPL for its use of riverbeds.
124
 
3. The Short Interruption Theory 
The United States Supreme Court also had trouble with the Montana Supreme 
Court’s “short interruption” theory.125 The Court admitted that it might find some 
interruptions to navigation so minimal that they merit treatment as part of a larger, 
navigable stretch of river.
126
 However, by analyzing portions of Lewis and Clark’s 
journals, the Court concluded that the interruptions in the rivers at hand had re-
quired substantial portages that had seriously interrupted travel along the streams 
when Montana was admitted to the Union.
127
 
By compounding the factors mentioned above, the Court reached its primary 
objection to the decision of the Montana Supreme Court: that when dealing with 
the “general subject” of title to riverbeds or streams, states cannot use rules to de-
termine navigability retroactively, which enlarge what had passed to the state when 
it was admitted to the Union.
128
 While the Court analyzed navigability of the rivers 
in PPL Montana with specificity, the Court failed to expand upon its recent discus-
sion of the judicial takings theory, which it had discussed only one year prior in 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Pro-
tection. 
The discussion below will demonstrate that the Court should have applied the 
judicial takings theory to the facts of PPL Montana, but ultimately concluded that 
the facts of the case did not support the conclusion that a judicial taking occurred. 
 
 
 
 
 
V. AMICUS BRIEFS FILED IN PPL MONTANA DISCUSSING TAKINGS AND 
ESTABLISHED PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
                                                          
 123. Id. at 1230. 
 124. Id.  
 125. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1230. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 1231. 
 128. Id. at 1235.  
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A. Briefs in Support of the Utility Company 
The Montana Supreme Court’s decision left many advocates uneasy about the 
future of private property rights in the West—especially concerning title surround-
ing navigable waterways. Accordingly, numerous amicus briefs were filed when 
PPL Montana wound its way before the United States Supreme Court, urging the 
Court to discuss the judicial takings theory in the case, and arguing that a judicial 
taking had deprived PPL Montana of its private property rights. 
The first in this line of amicus briefs directly attacked the Montana Supreme 
Court’s decision as a judicial taking: “The Montana Supreme Court's reinvention of 
the navigability-for-title test functionally operates as a judicial taking without just 
compensation.”129 The argument focused on Scalia’s words in Stop the Beach stat-
ing: “if a legislature or a court declares that what was once an established right of 
private property no longer exists, it has taken that property, no less than if the State 
had physically appropriated it or destroyed its value by regulation.”130 
Along with its takings argument, the Creekside Brief also urged that the Due 
Process Clause prohibits judicial destruction of private property rights.131 As urged 
in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Stop the Beach:132 “It is . . . natural to read the 
Due Process Clause as limiting the power of courts to eliminate or change estab-
lished property rights.”133 However, Justice Kennedy and the Creekside Brief both 
mischaracterized the protections afforded to private property owners in the Due 
Process Clause when a court departs from established property law.
134
 
 Another amicus brief in support of the utility company focused on the uncer-
tainty surrounding title to riverbeds under the Montana court’s present-day use the-
ory.
135
 Any future event, either natural or artificial, which transforms a non-
navigable riverbed into a navigable riverbed, may transfer title of that bed to the 
state.
136
 From a property owner’s perspective, many concerns surround the redefini-
tion of established property rights: 
a landowner may reasonably believe that he owns title to a riverbed under-
lying a section of river that everyone assumed was non-navigable when 
the state was admitted into the Union. Based upon that reasonable belief, 
the landowner may have invested substantial sums of money in construct-
ing water diversion facilities and may have used those facilities for dec-
                                                          
 129. Brief of the Creekside Coal. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, PPL Mont. v. 
Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012) (No. 10-218), 2011 WL 3947563 at *27 [hereinafter Creekside Brief]. 
 130. Id. at *27 (citing Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 
2592, 2602 (2010)). 
131
 Creekside Brief, supra note 129 at *28. 
 132. See supra Part III.A. 
 133. Creekside Brief, supra note 129 at *27–28 (citing Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. 
Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2605 (2010)). For additional discussion of the Due Process 
Clause as adequate protection for property rights, see infra Part VI.A.  
 134. See infra Part VI.A. 
 135. Brief of Mountain States Legal Found. and the Utah Farm Bureau Fed’n as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner, PPL Montana, LLC v. Mont., 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012) (No. 10-218), 2011 WL 
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ades for irrigation purposes. But under the Montana Supreme Court's new 
interpretation of the Equal Footing Doctrine, present-day use of the river 
could trump the landowner's settled and investment-backed expectations 
and transfer ownership of the portion of the riverbed to the state. In other 
words, the Montana Supreme Court's decision allows present-day use of a 
river to upset certainty of title.
137
 
Yet another amicus brief in support of the utility company argued that navi-
gability, when presented as it was in this case, is necessarily a concept of private 
property rights, and that title is necessarily the most important “stick” in the 
“Lockean bundle” of property rights. 138  As Justice Scalia asserted in Stop the 
Beach, the Takings Clause was not intended to address any particular branch or 
branches of government to the exclusion of others.
139
 Accordingly, a court takes 
property if it declares that a once-established private property right no longer ex-
ists.
140
 
Additionally, a line of reasoning inconsistent with Scalia’s argument in Stop 
the Beach would render the Takings Clause superfluous.
141
 Moreover, because 
courts have articulated rules prohibiting the judiciary from “violating non-
economic rights,” the judiciary must correspondingly be prohibited from “redefin-
ing, and in effect nullifying title to, private property rights.”142 Referencing the 
Montana Supreme Court’s action in PPL Montana I, the Farm Bureau Brief alleged 
that the court’s redefinition of PPL Montana’s title to the riverbed through the use 
of a “novel legal standard” is the definition of a court destroying rights by fiat.143 
Concluding that the Montana Supreme Court’s justification for its decision was 
ineffectual at best,
144
 the Farm Bureau Brief expressed the same concern for what 
such unbridled judicial declarations would do to established private property rights 
in the future.
145
 
As illustrated, these briefs contain the most animated arguments calling for an 
application of the judicial takings theory to the Montana Supreme Court’s decision 
in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana. Underlying the arguments from each organiza-
tion is a fear for the uncertainty created by judicial disregard for established proper-
ty rights, as well as a call to curb the current state of open-ended judicial ability to 
redefine property rights. The arguments put forth by organizations opposing PPL 
                                                          
 137. Id. at *32–33. 
 138. Brief of the Montana Farm Bureau Fed’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, PPL 
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Montana’s position,146 while powerful, fail to recognize the detrimental impacts of 
judicial interference with established private property rights. 
B. Briefs in Support of Montana 
Surprisingly, only one major amicus brief in support of respondent, State of 
Montana, addressed the judicial takings argument so prominent in the amicus briefs 
in support of petitioner.
147
 
The navigability arguments articulated in the California Sportfishing Brief fo-
cused primarily, and unsurprisingly, on the policy of the necessity of public access 
to navigable waterways.
148
 In support of such arguments, the California Sportfish-
ing Brief alleged that PPL Montana’s “piecemeal” approach to navigability threat-
ened to undermine the public trust rights of access to rivers and streams.
149
 The 
California Sportfishing Brief went on to state that a ruling in line with PPL Mon-
tana’s approach to navigability would initiate a flood of litigation as private entities 
attempt to “lay claim to riverbed resources.”150 If any of these lawsuits were suc-
cessful, the public’s right to use and enjoyment of waterways that were previously 
public property would be permanently lost.
151
 
What this argument ignored, however, is the fact that PPL Montana, and other 
utility companies, have operated hydroelectric facilities on these riverbeds for over 
a century, and that state agencies had assisted with the licensing procedures for the 
facilities.
152
 Moreover, without at least some possessory interest in the lands, in-
cluding riverbeds, underlying and surrounding the hydroelectric facilities, the pub-
lic would be at liberty to access and interfere, though likely unintentionally, with 
facility operations and hydroelectric production. Accordingly, public policy would 
dictate that at least some exclusionary ability exists for PPL Montana and other 
utility companies to protect utility facilities that provide direct benefit to the gen-
eral public in the form of power. Thus, in this case it appears that the need for hy-
droelectric power to the people dictates a dampening of the adage “power to the 
people.” 
The California Sportfishing Brief’s discussion of judicial takings centered on 
the assertion that PPL Montana has never had a private property interest in the riv-
erbeds. The takings argument began by declaring that nowhere in PPL Montana’s 
merits brief is it claimed that the decision of the Montana Supreme Court effected a 
taking.
153
 Unremarkably, the California Sportfishing Brief called for the Court to 
disregard the contentions of addressing the Takings Clause in the case as 
“wast[ing] the Court’s time.”154 While the California Sportfishing Brief accurately 
                                                          
 146. See infra Part V.B; see also supra Part III.C.1. 
 147. Brief of California Sportfishing Prot. Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respond-
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stated that PPL Montana did not raise the takings issue in its merits brief, the argu-
ment overlooked the Court’s precedent in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins 
that holds that federal claims are “adequately presented even though not raised in 
lower state courts when the highest state court renders an unexpected interpretation 
of state law or reverses its prior interpretation.”155 Accordingly, the Court had ju-
risdiction to address PPL Montana’s takings claims because the Montana Supreme 
Court’s decision was at the very least a departure from well-established property 
law precedent. 
Irrespective of this oversight on the part of PPL Montana, the California 
Sportfishing Brief alleged that if Montana’s navigability determinations were cor-
rect, then no private right to title of the riverbeds was created, and PPL Montana 
had no private property interest that could be taken.
156
 In furtherance of this asser-
tion, the argument pointed to a portion of Stop the Beach stating “insofar as courts 
merely clarify and elaborate property entitlements that were previously unclear, 
they cannot be said to have taken an established property right.”157 While the argu-
ment insinuated that this case concerns the clarification of property rights, it fails to 
consider the fact that PPL Montana, and its predecessors, operated utility facilities 
on the riverbeds in question with full consent of the State of Montana, and was 
never before made liable for rents due to the State.
158
 Given these circumstances, it 
would be more appropriate to label the source of the underlying lawsuit as a “land 
grab” on the part of Montana, as it tries to decrease federal landholdings within its 
borders. 
The Brief next discussed the appropriate venue for the articulation of property 
law. Citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,
159
 the Brief accurately as-
serted “property interests in general, are defined by state law.”160 In furtherance of 
Montana’s position, United States v. Cress161 was cited for the proposition that state 
law becomes even more important when flowing water and the land beneath it are 
at issue.
162
 Thus, PPL Montana would only have private property rights in the riv-
erbeds if that title had been granted under state law, and that “a property right is not 
established if there is doubt about its existence; and when there is doubt we do not 
make our own assessment but accept the determination of the state court.”163 Ac-
cordingly, the Montana Supreme Court’s ruling that PPL Montana had no private 
                                                          
 155. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85 n.9 (1980) (allowing a federal proce-
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 156. California Sportfishing Brief, supra note 147, at *24. 
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property interest in the riverbed under Montana state law disposes of any conten-
tion that a taking occurred in this case.
164
 
This premise, however, rests on the assumption that the State of Montana had 
gained title to the riverbeds in dispute when it was admitted to the union.
165
 Mon-
tana can only claim title to the beds of rivers and streams within its borders that 
were navigable at the time of its statehood.
166
 Accordingly, the premise that no tak-
ing occurred is not nearly as convincing after the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that the Montana Supreme Court had misapplied the determinative tests for 
navigability.
167
 
The California Sportfishing Brief also discussed the relationship between fed-
eralism and state property rulings, advocating that federalism precludes federal 
court “watchdogging” of state court decisions involving property rights. 168  The 
brief argued that the founding fathers delegated power of “the lives, liberties and 
properties” of the people to the individual states along with the “internal order, im-
provement and prosperity of the State.”169 It is true that the U.S. Supreme Court 
will generally not interfere when state courts interpret their own property law.
170
 
However, while this theory correctly notes that principles of federalism require 
deference to state court decisions of property law, the theory stands squarely in 
contention with the “adequate and independent state grounds doctrine,” under 
which state court decisions of property law are left intact only if the decision rests 
on state property law.
171
 
The California Sportfishing Brief also asserted that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, discussed below, precluded PPL Montana’s claims.172 
This cross-section of amicus briefs filed in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana 
represents the primary arguments asserted by each position in the action. As previ-
ously noted, the California Sportfishing Brief represents the only comprehensive 
discussion of the takings issue in the briefs in support of Montana.
173
 One possible 
explanation for other briefs’ silence on this topic could simply be that PPL Mon-
tana did not plead this theory in its merits brief to the Court. However, looking at 
the amicus filings in the case, it is clear that the parties with an interest in the action 
urged the Supreme Court to address the judicial takings issue. 
As illustrated in the amicus briefs supporting the utility company, the depar-
ture from settled property law by the Montana Supreme Court is extremely unset-
tling for property owners. By implementing a new test for determining navigability, 
the court undermined the meaning of private property throughout the state of Mon-
tana. The result of this new standard of review regarding navigability is that proper-
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ty owners cannot be sure whether the streams or rivers underlying their property are 
now navigable or non-navigable. 
Additionally, access to public trust lands was never threatened in this case.
174
 
Any ability to exclude the public from the riverbeds would encompass a very small 
area surrounding the hydroelectric facilities.
175
 Also, the departure from settled 
property law by the court necessarily redefines property rights without an oppor-
tunity to be heard, as required under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
176
 With so little consideration for private property rights, the argu-
ments set forth in the California Sportfishing Brief are unconvincing. 
VI. NO ALTERNATIVES EXIST THAT WOULD PRECLUDE THE 
NECESSITY OF THE COURT’S APPLICATION OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 
TO THE ACTIONS OF THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT 
Just as many entities argued that the Montana Supreme Court’s decision ef-
fected a taking under the Fifth Amendment, other entities with an interest in the 
outcome of the case at the United States Supreme Court level advocated that there 
are alternatives to the judicial takings theory,177 which provide adequate protection 
for property rights. However, none of the alternatives urged by supporters of the 
Montana Supreme Court’s decision provide the level of certainty regarding estab-
lished property rights that is needed in American society. Accordingly, none of 
purported alternatives warrant a rejection of the judicial takings theory. 
A. The Due Process Clause Does Not Offer Sufficient Protection to Property 
Owners to Warrant a Rejection of the Judicial Takings Theory 
One of the primary alternatives that critics posit to the judiciary as precluding 
an application of the Takings Clause is the Due Process Clause.
178
 In his concur-
rence in Stop the Beach, Justice Kennedy asserted that “[t]he Due Process Clause, 
in both its substantive and procedural aspects, is a central limitation upon the exer-
cise of judicial power,” and that the Court has held the Due Process Clause can be 
used by higher courts to invalidate erroneous property regulations by lower 
courts.
179
 Justice Kennedy went as far as saying that the “natural” reading of the 
Due Process Clause places limits on a court’s ability to eliminate established prop-
erty rights.
180
 
However, not all property owners would agree that the Due Process Clause 
provides sufficient protection for their rights.
181
 At least one amicus brief in support 
of the utility company accurately asserted that the same concerns underlying a judi-
cial elimination of established property rights that arise under the Due Process 
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Clause also arise under the Takings Clause—namely, that “[b]oth are concerned 
with protecting and sustaining established rights.”182 The redefinition of property 
rights by a court implicates the Due Process Clause, though property owners—
whose rights have been “subsumed” by a court’s departure from established proper-
ty law—cannot be said to have had their day in court.183 The Montana Supreme 
Court’s redefinition of navigability for title purposes altered the established proper-
ty rights of Montana landowners without giving them an opportunity to be heard. 
Accordingly, because the Montana Supreme Court, and other state courts, can ef-
fect changes in property law that redefine established property rights, without 
providing those affected with an opportunity to be heard, the Due Process Clause is 
not an adequate alternative to an application of the Takings Clause to the judiciary. 
B. Deference to State Court Interpretations of Property Law Does Not Insulate 
State Courts From an Application of the Judicial Takings Theory 
Many critics of the judicial takings theory assert the Takings Clause cannot 
apply to actions of state courts because state courts are generally given full defer-
ence to interpret property law.
184
 This concern is well founded, as it is well settled 
that state courts are the appropriate venue for deciding matters arising under a giv-
en state’s laws.185 In fact, in his concurrence in Stop the Beach, Justice Breyer’s 
primary concern with an application of the Takings Clause to judicial action was 
that property law is generally governed by states individually.
186
 There is a strong 
argument that a state supreme court’s interpretation and application of state law is 
preferable over the same analysis conducted by a federal court, simply because of 
the state court’s greater familiarity with the laws of the state in which it sits.187 
The U.S. Supreme Court will not review state court decisions that “rest on ad-
equate and independent state grounds.”188 Further, a state court decision that ap-
plies federal law is adequate and independent if the decision does not raise a federal 
question and rests on a state law that is adequate to support the judgment.
189
 As 
stated in Herb v. Pitcairn, the limit on the Court’s ability to review adequate and 
independent state grounds is “found in the partitioning of power between the state 
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and federal judicial systems and in the limitations of [the Court’s] jurisdiction.”190 
This rule governs irrespective of procedural or substantive state law grounds.
191
 
State court decisions involving property law are given deference, however, 
only if the decision rests on an application of state property law.
192
 The Pitcairn 
Court went on to state: “Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to 
the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights.”193 The reasoning of the Pit-
cairn Court fits squarely with Justice Stewart’s candid and rational approach to the 
Takings Clause.
194
 Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Hughes v. Washington ad-
dressed a property dispute very similar to that in PPL Montana: property that an 
individual rightfully believed was hers was declared public domain by the state 
court.
195
 Naturally, Justice Stewart explained, the state court never perceived that it 
had in effect taken Ms. Hughes’ property.196 
A state court’s exercise of authority may impair established property rights 
without any intention of the court to do so.
197
 Irrespective of a state court’s intent, 
however, “the Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a State says, 
or by what it intends, but by what it does.”198 Stewart held the “State” in Hughes 
effected a taking without the use of its power of eminent domain by transforming 
private property into public.
199
 Indeed, Justice Stewart’s assertion that a state court 
can effect a taking just as a state legislature can resonates in Justice Scalia’s plurali-
ty in Stop the Beach.
200
 
As further articulated by Justice Stewart, judicial takings occur when a state 
court decision effects a “sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of the 
relevant precedents.”201 Moreover, in determining whether such a change has oc-
curred, the relevant inquiry is what a state court does, not what it claims or intends 
to accomplish.
202
 
At the very least, the Montana Supreme Court’s decision represents a sudden 
change in state property law, unpredictable when compared with relevant prece-
dents. The state court determined navigability in a manner wholly inconsistent with 
that advocated, and documented, by the U.S. Supreme Court—making it very un-
likely that those with property interests affected by the state court’s decision would 
have ever expected the outcome they received.
203
 In its determination of navigabil-
ity of the disputed waterways, the Montana Supreme Court admitted that some por-
tions of the rivers were not navigable when Montana entered the Union.
204
 Ignoring 
these “short interruptions” in navigability, the court decided to determine navigabil-
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ity by assessing the rivers as wholes.
205
 This approach to determining navigability 
was completely rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court,
206
 and accordingly cannot be 
said to be a predictable application of state law, in accord with relevant precedents. 
Additionally, the state court in PPL Montana I cannot be said to have been 
developing state property law, which states have long been held to be able to do.
207
 
Instead, the Montana Supreme Court determined navigability of the disputed wa-
terways by applying tests under federal law—deciding that title to the riverbeds 
vested in the state under the equal-footing doctrine.
208
 The application of federal 
law by a state court for the benefit of that state,
209
 in no way illustrates the normal 
course of a state developing its own property law: “[f]or a State cannot be permitted 
to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process 
of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it has taken 
never existed at all.”210 
Justice Stewart’s reasoning in Hughes seems eerily relevant after reviewing 
the facts of PPL Montana. Many of the facilities operated by PPL Montana and its 
predecessors have been in existence for decades, with no title-based objection by 
the State until the case was first filed in Montana District Court.
211
 Additionally, 
multiple state agencies assisted in the various licensing procedures for the utility 
facilities.
212
 While PPL Montana had been paying rents to the United States for the 
use of riverbeds and uplands that were flooded by its hydroelectric facilities,
213
 
causing the private property requirement of the judicial takings analysis to fail, the 
actions of the Montana Supreme Court represent an effort to subsume the property 
interests of riparian property owners throughout the state. The court applied tests 
under federal law in order to determine navigability for title purposes, and effected 
a change in the established navigability analysis.
214
 Thus, the decision of the state 
court in PPL Montana does not represent adequate and independent state action 
grounds; the state court’s decision relied on federal law regarding the application of 
navigability tests, and no state law adequately supported the decision. Accordingly, 
because state court decisions regarding property law do not always rest on adequate 
and independent state grounds, such decisions should not be insulated from the 
judicial takings theory. 
VII. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS A CONSIDERATION IN PPL 
MONTANA 
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While there is no doubt that the primary dispute in PPL Montana concerned 
title to riverbeds and whether PPL Montana owed rent to the State of Montana,
215
 
another dispute—access to Montana’s streams and rivers—is present throughout 
the case and the Montana Supreme Court’s decision. Indeed, the central concern 
underlying the amicus briefs filed in support of Montana may be public access to 
rivers and streambeds in Montana. It may be that in the arid west, access to streams 
and other waterways is as valuable as the streams themselves. Thus, it should come 
as no surprise that those whose livelihoods depend upon access to streams and riv-
ers would fight to keep their sources of livelihood intact. Accordingly, by analyzing 
arguments surrounding the public trust doctrine and access to Montana’s streams 
and rivers, the muddy waters of PPL Montana become clearer. 
A. Background of the Public Trust Doctrine 
Disputes regarding access to waterways are nothing new in the American ju-
dicial system or culture. While most contemporary disputes over stream access 
involve western waters, the value of stream access is not unique to the west, and for 
that reason access to navigable waterways has been deemed paramount throughout 
the nation for much of its history.
216
 As a means of providing the public with access 
to the nation’s navigable waterways, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the public 
trust doctrine.
217
 
Fundamentally, the doctrine requires that the individual states of the union 
hold public resources in trust for the people of those states.
218
 For instance, public 
access to the banks of a navigable river in Idaho is protected by the doctrine up to 
the ordinary high water mark.
219
 While initially limited to navigable waterways, the 
doctrine’s scope has expanded to include: lakes, riparian banks, aquifers, marshes, 
wetlands, springs, groundwater, beach access, trees and forests, parks, wildlife, 
fossil beds, and entire ecosystems.
220
 The doctrine has also been recognized as a 
flexible common law principle, which can be extended to meet changing needs of 
the public.
221
 At least some state legislatures and agencies have used the obligations 
imposed by the public trust doctrine to limit development or use of lands encum-
bered by the doctrine.
222
 As needs of the public change, the specific resources pro-
tected by the doctrine may be extended to meet those needs.
223
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Primarily a state common law doctrine, the public trust doctrine is codified by 
most states in their statutes or constitutions.
224
 In Montana, the public trust doctrine 
and the state constitution create an “instream, non-diversionary right” in the public 
to the recreational use of navigable surface waters in the state, and private parties 
are not permitted to interfere with the public’s recreational use of such surface wa-
ters.
225
 The doctrine also places certain constraints on state action.
226
 For example, 
a state cannot surrender the trust through a transfer of title to public trust lands be-
cause a state’s responsibilities under the doctrine are analogous to its responsibili-
ties to preserve the peace and exercise its police powers—all are powers which 
cannot be abdicated by the state.
227
 
B. The Public Trust Doctrine and the Takings Clause 
The public trust doctrine plays a noteworthy role in a takings analysis, as 
courts have restricted private property rights on public trust principles in disputes 
involving: beach access, water use, navigable waters, tidelands, forests, and oil 
reserves.
228
 In Phillips Petroleum Company v. Mississippi,
229
 the Court held that the 
state had acquired title to all lands subject to tides as opposed to only navigable 
waterways. In that case, the majority stated “individual States have the authority to 
define the limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in 
such lands as they see fit.”230 
To fully grasp the limitations placed on a private property owner’s rights, an 
understanding of state law encumbrances of private property is needed. In order to 
determine whether a property owner has suffered a taking, a court must first deter-
mine whether any law encumbers the proscribed uses of the property.
231
 If any laws 
prevent the property owner from using his land in a particular manner, the owner 
never had full title to the land in the first place.
232
 Laws encumbering the title to 
private property have traditional basis in “background principles of the [s]tate’s law 
of property or nuisance.”233 Accordingly, a regulation, or court decision, that takes 
away a property interest encumbered by a background principle of state law does 
not take anything that the property owner ever had to lose.
234
 
While the Lucas Court failed to delineate the meaning of “background princi-
ple of state law,” 235 lower court decisions have helped solidify the term. The back-
ground principle must: 1) be a state law or doctrine; 2) not be newly enacted; 3) not 
restrict more than what could be achieved in court; 4) apply to all landowners; and 
                                                          
 224. See id. at 456–57. 
 225. Mont. Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Co., 255 P.3d 179, 184–85 (Mont. 2011). 
 226. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
 227. Id.  
 228. See Bramley, supra note 220, at 457–58. 
 229. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
 230. Id. at 475.  
 231. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
 232. Id. at 1029. 
 233. See id.  
 234. See Bramley, supra note 220, at 454. 
 235. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
194 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50 
 
5) not have ambiguous application.
236
 If these five factors are satisfied, then the 
property owner never had full title to the property in the first place.
237
 
Many lower courts have recognized the public trust doctrine as a background 
principle of state law,
238
 however the Supreme Court has never directly addressed 
that question.
239
 Notably, there are some instances in which courts have declined to 
recognize the public trust doctrine as a background principle; namely, when: an 
established state regulation contradicts with the doctrine; property use is limited 
beyond the doctrine’s boundaries; or a federal court decision depends on state law 
that is silent regarding the doctrine.
240
 
In sum, the public trust doctrine is a state common law principle that protects 
the public’s access to public resources. Generally, the doctrine protects public ac-
cess to navigable waterways, though it can be broadened to cover other resources as 
well. Additionally, public lands encumbered by the doctrine generally cannot be 
transferred out of the state’s trust, though the doctrine can impact private property 
rights. Because the doctrine may encumber the use of private property, it may in-
variably alter the extent of title to private property. Accordingly, government action 
that takes away a property interest encumbered by the doctrine may not take any-
thing that the property owner ever had to lose—compelling consideration of the 
doctrine in any takings analysis. 
C. The Public Trust Doctrine’s Effect in PPL Montana 
The amicus briefs in support of Montana rightfully raised the public trust doc-
trine as an influential factor in the outcome of the case.
 241
 In PPL Montana I, the 
utility company was the party initially arguing the disputed riverbeds were public 
trust lands.
242
 A major concern for those advocating on behalf of Montana was pub-
lic access to Montana’s rivers and streams.243 Those advocating a discussion of the 
public trust doctrine in PPL Montana undoubtedly felt that a public right, access to 
Montana’s rivers, was being stripped from the public.244 Interest groups, such as the 
California Sportfishing Protection Alliance, which advocated a public need for fish-
ing access, have a meritorious cause, as access to fishing has long been recognized 
as a protected right of the public under the doctrine.
245
 The arguments set forth by 
such organizations follow the premise that because the Montana Supreme Court 
declared that the riverbeds were navigable at the time of Montana’s statehood, the 
riverbeds fell into the state’s trust and the public accordingly has a right of access 
to them. 
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However, the public trust argument fails to consider the extent of the utility 
company’s interference with public access to rivers and streams. The public would 
only be excluded from accessing the lands underlying PPL Montana’s utility facili-
ties.
246
 Additionally, PPL Montana could likely argue that it holds a right to ex-
clude the public from the areas immediately surrounding its utility facilities, even 
though it rents the land, necessitated by considerations of public safety. A court 
would be unlikely to find that the public’s right to access public trust lands war-
rants public access to the dangerous areas immediately surrounding a hydroelectric 
facility. 
VIII. MOVING FORWARD WITH AN APPLICATION OF THE JUDICIAL 
TAKINGS THEORY 
The discussion above demonstrates that there is a need for an application of 
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause to judicial actions affecting property. 
American government is fundamentally a system of checks and balances, ensuring 
that no single branch of government becomes unreasonably more powerful than the 
others.
247
 In line with this premise, and as noted in amicus briefs supporting Mon-
tana’s position, principles of federalism dictate limited government intrusion and 
authority over the citizens and states of the United States.
248
 It is not difficult to see 
that the judiciary would have far too much power if it were deemed able to declare 
as public what was once private property by simply implementing a new interpreta-
tion of settled law. The judicial takings theory, including its underlying principles, 
provides the most effective protection of private property rights from judicial fiat. 
However, as of yet, no Court decision has collectively established the parameters of 
an application of the Takings Clause to the judiciary. 
A. What Type of Court Action Constitutes a Judicial Taking? 
While both sides of the judicial takings debate set forth many arguments, the 
standard of judicial action that would qualify as a taking is rarely discussed. Per-
haps the most definitive articulation of what judicial actions comprise a judicial 
taking comes from Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Stop the Beach, asserting 
that a court takes property if it declares that a once-established private property 
right no longer exists.
249
 However, as this statement comes from a plurality, the 
question of what standard of scrutiny should be applied to judicial action under the 
takings analysis remains open. 
In a concurrence in Hughes v. Washington,
250
 Justice Stewart laid out an early 
articulation of what exactly constitutes a judicial taking. As long as a state supreme 
court’s decision conforms to “reasonable expectations” of state property law, that 
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decision should be granted deference.
251
 However, if that court’s decision consti-
tutes a sudden change in state property law that is unpredictable, no such deference 
should be given.
252
 Accordingly, the relevant standard under this articulation of the 
judicial takings theory is foreseeability.
253
 
The Reply Brief for Petitioner in Stop the Beach urges a different standard of 
review.
254
 There, it was argued that the proper standard of review, as repeatedly 
applied to state court decisions on property law, is the “fair or substantial basis” 
standard.
255
 If the state is interested in the outcome, the Court should exercise a 
more searching review of the state court’s decision.256 
Another standard of review was created when Justice Scalia departed from 
Hughes in Stop the Beach. Scalia’s plurality opinion in Stop the Beach rejected the 
foreseeability test in favor of an “established property right” standard.257 This stems 
back to Scalia’s articulation that courts “effect a taking if they recharacterize as 
public property what was previously private property.”258 Though neither standard 
is afforded precedential value, the established property right standard may still re-
quire Justice Stewart’s foreseeability standard from Hughes.259 
The correct standard for determining judicial takings involves a combination 
of the established property right and foreseeability tests. Although neither test cur-
rently has precedential value, the foreseeability test closely follows Scalia’s pro-
nouncement in Stop the Beach that a judicial taking involves re-characterization of 
an established property right.
260
 The language used in Justice Stewart’s dissent—
“sudden change in state law”—amounts to an equivalent of Scalia’s re-
characterization.
261
 Accordingly, a combination of both standards of review is 
needed in order to provide an accurate assessment of whether judicial action has 
effected a taking.
262
 Thus, the correct standard of review under the judicial takings 
theory involves a two-step inquiry, determining whether a court: 1) effected an un-
foreseeable change in state law; that 2) eliminated an established property right. 
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B. What Facts Would Affect a Judicial Taking? 
Having identified the elements necessary to make judicial action a judicial 
taking, it is next necessary to delineate what type of factual setting would amount 
to a judicial taking. 
As the Takings Clause only applies to private property,
263
 a judicial taking 
would necessarily begin with a tract of private property—likely, a large tract of 
private land. Rights in that private property would also need to have been recog-
nized by the State under property law precedent up until the applicable judicial ac-
tion.
264
 Additionally, the applicable judicial action must constitute an unforeseeable 
change in, or re-characterization of, property law that eliminates the property right 
that, at all times prior, had been recognized by the state.
265
 This unforeseeable de-
parture from state law, eliminating a previously recognized right in private proper-
ty, would amount to a judicial taking and require compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
Accordingly, in order for the facts of a case to constitute a judicial taking, 
there must be: 1) private property; 2) recognition by the state of rights in that pri-
vate property; 3) an unforeseeable change in, or re-characterization of, property law 
by a court; and 4) the change in state law must eliminate the previously recognized 
property right. 
In order for the Court to have found a judicial taking in PPL Montana, the 
utility facilities would have first needed to be located completely within a tract of 
private land that completely surrounded the bed of a non-navigable stream or river. 
If the stream or river were deemed non-navigable at the time of Montana’s state-
hood, then the title would not have passed directly to the state under the equal-
footing doctrine. The State would need to have previously acknowledged the utility 
company’s rights in the property, though this would likely be established by the 
State’s collection of property tax on the property. If the Montana Supreme Court, 
under this factual scenario, were to then declare the stream on which the utility fa-
cility was located as navigable for title purposes at the time of Montana’s state-
hood, the utility company’s previously established private rights in the property 
would be completely eliminated. 
Under such facts, the a federal court would be correct in finding that the state 
court had taken PPL Montana’s property, and the court would then properly act 
either to reverse the state court, or order an award of just compensation. 
IX. FINAL THOUGHTS ON THE JUDICIAL TAKINGS THEORY AS 
APPLIED TO PPL MONTANA 
While the factual setting of PPL Montana is similar to that in Stop the Beach, 
several complications preclude an application of the judicial takings theory to PPL 
Montana. In order for judicial action to constitute a judicial taking, there must be: 
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1) private property; 2) recognition by the state of rights in that private property; 3) 
an unforeseeable change in, or re-characterization of, property law by a court; and 
4) the change in state law must eliminate the previously recognized property right. 
The facts of PPL Montana are inadequate to support a conclusion that the utility 
company suffered a judicial taking. 
To begin with, there is no private property in dispute in PPL Montana.
 266
 
PPL Montana has never been held to own the riverbeds underlying its utility facili-
ties. Rather, PPL Montana leased the riverbeds, paying rent to the federal govern-
ment.
267
 The effect of the Montana Supreme Court’s decision can, perhaps, be bet-
ter characterized as forcing PPL Montana to pay rent to a different landlord. 
It is also unclear as to whether Montana, or the federal government, ever rec-
ognized that PPL Montana had rights in the riverbeds as private property. As a mat-
ter of public policy, and as noted earlier, PPL Montana may possess a limited abil-
ity to exclude the public from certain areas of its hydroelectric facilities for the sake 
of public safety. Various state agencies also assisted PPL Montana and its prede-
cessors with federal licensing proceedings concerning the hydroelectric facilities.
268
 
However, the State’s assistance with licensing and a limited ability to exclude the 
public are not definitive acknowledgments of any specific property right regarding 
PPL Montana’s use of the riverbeds. 
One factor of the judicial takings analysis that is present in PPL Montana is 
the requirement that a state court effect an unforeseeable change in, or re-
characterization of, property law.
 269
 Prior to the lawsuits in this case, the riverbeds 
underlying PPL Montana’s hydroelectric facilities had been deemed non-navigable 
at the time of Montana’s statehood, which passed title to the riverbeds to the federal 
government.
270
 When the Montana Supreme Court decided that the rivers under 
consideration were actually navigable when Montana became a state, the court de-
parted from the previously settled application of law by looking at factors that had 
not been previously considered when determining navigability.
271
 This re-
characterization of property law can be characterized as unforeseeable because the 
state court’s decision “was based upon an infirm legal understanding of this Court’s 
rules of navigability for title under the equal-footing doctrine.”272 
However, the facts of PPL Montana do not support the conclusion that the 
Montana Supreme Court’s decision eliminated an established property right. 273 
Prior to the lawsuit in PPL Montana, the utility company had paid rent to the feder-
al government for its use of the riverbeds.
274
 Thus, PPL Montana’s interest in the 
riverbeds can be analogized to that of a tenant’s interest in an apartment. The effect 
of the Montana Supreme Court’s decision required the utility company to pay rents 
to the state.
275
 Thus, the underlying quarrel in PPL Montana really concerns a dis-
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pute between landlords. The tenant, PPL Montana, was paying rents to its landlord, 
the United States, when suddenly another landlord, Montana, told the tenant to start 
paying it instead of the initial landlord.
 276
 The only change the utility company 
experienced was whom it paid rents to.
 277
 Accordingly, PPL Montana enjoyed the 
same rights to the riverbeds under the state court’s decision as it had previously. 278 
With the absence of several requirements of a judicial taking in the facts of 
PPL Montana, the Court’s failure to address the theory makes more sense. Justice 
Kennedy delivered the Court’s opinion in PPL Montana.279 He also moved strongly 
against the judicial takings theory in Stop the Beach.
280
 Accordingly, it is not hard 
to see why Justice Kennedy failed to mention the judicial takings theory in PPL 
Montana. 
However, Justice Scalia’s failure to raise the issue in either a concurrence or a 
dissent is puzzling. A likely explanation could be because he too recognized that 
several requirements of a judicial taking were not contained in the case’s facts. In 
any event, the Court’s choice not to address the judicial takings theory in PPL 
Montana may signal the Court’s reluctance to revive the theory until the perfect set 
of facts winds its way before the Court. 
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